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INTRODUCTION
A wife has a brief affair but soon ends it without ever telling her
husband. When the couple find out they are expecting a baby, they are
overjoyed. They both assume the baby is the husband’s until standard
blood tests taken at the baby’s birth exclude the husband as a possible
biological father. After counseling they are able to resolve their conflicts
and remain together, welcoming the baby into their family. However, they
also allow the baby’s biological father and his wife to spend time with the
baby, including weekly overnight visits. Upon the biological mother’s
return to work, the biological father’s wife assumes childcare
responsibilities. When the child is two years old, the biological mother and
her husband decide that they no longer want the biological father and his
wife involved with their family, and they cut off contact.1
*
Deborah Wald is an attorney specializing in non-traditional family formation work,
with offices in the San Francisco Bay Area.
1. See Craig L. v. Sandy S., 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 606, 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (discussing
the background of a case with factual similarities, involving a child with two “fathers”—the
child’s biological father and the husband of the child’s mother).
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How many parents does this child have, and who are they?
A lesbian couple decide to have a child together. One provides the eggs,
which are fertilized with sperm from an anonymous sperm donor and then
implanted in the uterus of the other. They give birth to twins, whom they
raise together for five years. However, they never tell the twins that the
mother who did not give birth is actually their genetic mother. When they
break up, the birth mother asserts that she is the only legal parent and tries
to cut off contact between the twins and the genetic mother.2
Do these children have one mother or two?
A woman gives birth to a baby boy. Within a few months, her older
daughter, who lives with her, also gives birth to a baby. Mother and
daughter raise the two babies together, and the daughter nurses both babies
while her mother is at work.
When her mother dies suddenly, the daughter continues to raise the
children together as siblings. She has another baby of her own and the three
children grow up believing that they are siblings and that the young woman
is their mother. In school records and other official documents, however,
she acknowledges that one of the children is her biological brother.
When this young woman gets arrested for peripheral involvement in a
drug conspiracy, all three children are temporarily taken from her. As a
mother, she is entitled to reunification services with her two biological
children, but the third child—her biological brother—is in danger of being
separated from the other two children and placed in foster care.3
What is the legal relationship of this young woman and this child?
A collection of factors have combined to make this an extraordinarily
complex and confusing time in history for determining legal parentage of
children. These factors include the following:
(1)

The mind-boggling number of children in foster and kinship care—
creating a pressing need to do a better job of finding “parents” for
young and vulnerable children;

(2)

The rapid changes in medical technology whereby egg donors,
sperm donors, in vitro fertilization, and surrogacy are becoming
commonplace;

(3)

The rise in divorce rates and the accompanying rise in stepparent
and “blended” families; and

2. See K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 680 (Cal. 2005) (holding that both lesbian partners
were mothers of the twins).
3. See In re Salvador M., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705, 709 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (issuing an
order granting the woman presumed mother status and de facto parent status of her
biological half-brother).
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The increasing numbers of single people and same-sex couples
choosing to become parents through assisted reproduction or
adoption.

All of these phenomena combine to create a perplexing and fascinating
puzzle—the parentage puzzle.
As our courts and legislatures grapple with solving this puzzle, the
primary factors they have considered are procreative intent, genetics, the
marital presumption,4 and parental conduct. In the “traditional” family
model, all of these factors lead to the same conclusion: that the husband
and wife are the parents of the child. In other words, in such a family, the
genetic parents have intentionally conceived their children within the
context of their marriage and will be acting in the role of parents with
regard to those children. But this model “traditional” family is no longer
the norm, or even the majority, and, in an ever-increasing number of cases,
legal and social policy issues arise because these factors do not all point to
the same people.
Further, as we redefine and broaden what we mean by the term “parent,”
more and more situations surface where more than two people fit our
expanded definitions. When we look to intent and conduct—instead of
only biology or marriage—to create legal parent-child relationships, it
quickly becomes clear that there may be more than two people who are
candidates for the legal title “parent.”
So far, courts have been reluctant to find more than two parents for any
given child due to some combination of distaste for “non-traditional”
families and concern about putting children in the middle of increasingly
complex custody disputes. While courts have expanded their definitions of
“parent” to include more people and encompass adults parenting in less
traditional families, including same-sex families and families created with
the use of assisted reproductive technologies, they have maintained the
rigid idea that a child can have only two legal parents. Thus, even when
courts find that three or more adults have standing to seek parentage, the
outcome of such cases still tends to protect the child’s relationship with
only two of those adults. Frequently, the best interests of the child are
neither considered in the process nor served by the outcome.
Contrary to the fears of some courts, finding parentage in more than two
4. See Debi McRae, Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Best Interests Marital
Presumption of Paternity: Is It Actually in the Best Interests of Children to Divorce the
Current Application of the Best Interests Marital Presumption of Paternity, 5 WHITTIER J.
CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 345, 348 (2006) (asserting that “marital presumption,” included in
some form in most state family codes, presumes that a child conceived during and/or born
into an intact marriage is the legal child of both the husband and the wife). Whether this
presumption is a conclusive presumption or a rebuttable presumption, and what facts will
cause the presumption to be rebutted, varies from state to state. Id. at 351
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adults need not lead to further fragmentation of physical or legal custody;
instead, the courts can and should move to a “best interests” analysis5 on
behalf of children in which all relevant adults can be considered.
Presumably, it will only be in the unusual case that, after due consideration,
a court ultimately divides physical custody among more than two adults.
But without a finding of parentage, the adults who are “non-parents”
generally find themselves shut out completely, and children end up losing
all contact with and support from adults on whom they had relied and who
had functioned as their parents. Further, the courts’ formulaic refusal to
consider the option that children can have more than two parents is leading
to some vicious, and I submit unnecessary, tugs of war between fit and
caring individuals who might otherwise be able to forge productive coparenting arrangements to the benefit of the child.6
This article will explore parentage issues affecting two specific
categories of children: (1) children conceived with the use of Assisted
Reproductive Technologies (“ART”), including those born to same-sex
couples; and (2) children born as a result of extra-marital affairs. I will
examine how courts have determined who should be recognized as legal
parents and consider whether it is in the best interests of children to
recognize more than two legal parents when the children are intentionally
conceived and/or successfully parented by more than two people. Finally, I
will argue that courts should entertain parentage actions, as well as custody
and/or visitation actions, brought by as many adults as have meaningfully
contributed to parenting a child. By not mechanistically limiting the
number to two, some critical adults will not find themselves completely
shut out of the process. In addition, I will argue that courts should use a
best interests approach to resolving any disputes among these adults.
I. ESTABLISHING PARENTAGE IN FAMILIES OF CHOICE
A. Children Conceived Using Assisted Reproductive Technologies
In the last twenty years, advances in modern medicine have made it
possible for many people previously considered infertile to conceive and
bear children. In the simplest case, this involves in vitro fertilization of a
wife’s egg with her husband’s sperm, with the resulting embryo transferred
5. Nolo, Glossary: Best Interests of the child, http://www.nolo.com/definition.cfm/
Term/2AC7A5A3-29CC-44C8-ACCBC7DCB1F09395/alpha/B/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2007)
(defining what is involved in a “best interests” analysis, which is the test the courts use
when deciding who will take care of a child).
6. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (affirming a lower court
decision where a child was found to have no legal relationship with her genetic father
because the California statute at issue made it irrelevant for paternity purposes who begot
the child; if the child was subsequently born to a married mother, the mother’s husband is
responsible for the child).
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back into the wife’s womb for gestation. In this scenario, the husband and
wife intentionally are procreating children conceived of their own genetic
material and presumably are going to raise those children, posing few of
the special problems involved in determining parentage in the modern era.
However, families created with the use of ART are often much more
complicated.
The importance of the ART cases is twofold. First, these cases call into
question the value we place on genetics in assigning parental rights, in light
of the fact that many ART cases involve children who are intentionally
conceived on behalf of parents to whom they are not genetically related.
Second, these cases highlight the issue of procreative intent as a basis for
establishing legal parenthood.7 By doing so, ART cases have paved the
way for many of the cutting edge developments in family law, and,
therefore, they serve as an important starting place for examining issues of
genetics, intentionality, and parental responsibility.
Surrogacy is fast becoming one of the most traditional of the “nontraditional” ways of conceiving a child. There are two types of surrogacy:
gestational and traditional. Gestational surrogacy involves a surrogate who
gestates the child but has no genetic relationship with it; whereas, in
“traditional” surrogacy, the surrogate’s own egg is used, rendering her both
the genetic and the gestational mother.
When a heterosexual married couple conceive a child using the wife’s
egg fertilized in vitro with the husband’s sperm, but the baby is carried to
term by a “gestational surrogate,” there are two possible mothers: the
genetic mother and the gestational mother.8 Most states that have ruled on
this type of surrogacy arrangement have found that the husband and wife
are the legal parents of the child, and that the woman who carried the child
is not a parent based on one or both of two theories: intentionality and
genetics.
The lead cases in this area come from California and Ohio, and they
resolve the issues in very different ways. In Johnson v. Calvert,9 the
7. See William Joseph Wagner, The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative
Resources and Parental Rights: The Natural Endowment Critique, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1 n.173 (1990) (defining “procreative intent” to mean the intentional conduct by which
people have chosen to conceive children with the intent to parent those children).
8. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102 (amended 2002) (abandoning use of the term
“surrogate” in favor of the term “gestational mother” in the most recent version of the Act,
approved by the American Bar Association in 2002 and now being circulated by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws). As explained in their
Comment to Section 102: “For purposes of this Act, a woman giving birth to her own
genetic child, a.k.a. ‘birth mother,’ is distinguished from a ‘gestational mother.’ The former
is both a gestational and genetic mother, while the latter also gives birth to a child, who may
or may not be her genetic child. In the Act the term ‘gestational mother’ is narrowly defined
to restrict it to a situation in which a woman gives birth to a child pursuant to a gestational
agreement . . . .” Id.
9. 851 P.2d. 776, 776 (Cal. 1993) (discussing the factual background of the case,
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California Supreme Court resolved a dispute between a child’s
genetic/intended mother and the gestational surrogate by placing
dispositive weight on the parties’ pre-birth intentions. The court found
that:
[A]lthough the [Uniform Parentage] Act recognizes both genetic
consanguinity and giving birth as a means of establishing a mother
and child relationship, when the two means do not coincide in one
woman, she who intended to procreate the child—that is, she who
intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise
as her own is the natural mother under California law.10

In Johnson, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) filed an
amicus brief suggesting that the appropriate outcome, where both the
gestational mother and the genetic mother desired a continued relationship
with the child, would be to find that the child had two legal mothers.11 In
other words, the ACLU argued that the child had three parents: the father,
the genetic mother, and the gestational mother. The court declined to
follow this suggestion, finding that:
Even though rising divorce rates have made multiple parent
arrangements common in our society, we see no compelling reason to
recognize such a situation here. . . . To recognize parental rights in a
third party with whom the Calvert family has had little contact since
shortly after the child’s birth would diminish [Mrs. Calvert’s] role as
mother.12

“[F]or any child,” the court concluded, “California law recognizes only one
natural mother, despite advances in reproductive technology rendering a
different outcome biologically possible.”13
Years after Johnson was decided, California passed the Domestic
Partners Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003, which provides that
almost all the rights and responsibilities of married couples now apply to
registered domestic partners under California law.14 This presumably
wherein a couple contracted with a woman to bear a child using the couple’s genetic
material; when the woman attempted to back out, the couple sued to have their rights as
parents of the child enforced).
10. Id. at 782 (reasoning that the intention of the parties involved determines
parenthood as legally understood).
11. See id. at 781 n. 8 (rejecting the ACLU’s argument because recognizing a third
party’s parental status would diminish the role of the genetic mother, whom the court
deemed to be the parent of the child).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 781. But see Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, 117 P.3d. 660,
665-66 (Cal. 2005) (overruling the premise that a California child can have only one natural
mother in the context of children born into lesbian partnerships).
14. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (2007) (codifying the Domestic Partners Rights and
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includes the marital presumptions attaching to children born during a
marriage.15 By so doing, and under case law discussed below, California
has acknowledged that a child can have two natural mothers (using the
term “natural” as a term of art referring to a non-adoptive legal mother16),
in the persons of registered same-sex domestic partners who give birth
during their partnership.17 With California now recognizing, at least in this
limited context, that a child can have two natural mothers, question why
this same principle could not be applied in the context of a surrogacy case
to find that both the gestational and the genetic mothers are legal mothers
with a right to shared custody or, at the very least, continued contact
through visitation.18
The potential desirability of such a result is illustrated by In re Marriage
of Moschetta, a California surrogacy case decided after Johnson, in which a
surrogate gave birth to a child conceived under a traditional surrogacy
arrangement.19 In this case, the court applied the rules of Johnson whereby
intent is determinative if the genetic mother and the gestational mother are
two different women, thereby creating a “tie” between two mothers, and
determined that where the surrogate was both the genetic and the
gestational mother, she was the natural and legal mother of the child.20
Responsibilities Act of 2003 and providing that domestic partners have the same rights and
responsibilities as married couples).
15. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(a) (2007) (stating that a man is presumed to be a
father if he and the child’s natural mother are or have been married to each other and the
child is born during the marriage or within 300 days after its end); CAL. FAM. CODE §
7613(a) (2007) (providing that a man is the natural father of a child if that child is conceived
with his consent by assisted reproduction using donor sperm).
16. See Elisa B., 117 P.3d. at 666 (clarifying that what they were objecting to in
Johnson v. Calvert was not the possibility that the child would have two mothers, but rather
the possibility that the child would end up with three parents—two mothers and a father).
17. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (2007) (codifying the Domestic Partner Rights and
Responsibilities Act of 2003, which provides in Part (a) that: “Registered domestic partners
shall have the same rights, protections, and benefits, and shall be subject to the same
responsibilities, obligations, and duties under law, whether they derive from statutes,
administrative regulations, court rules, government policies, common law, or any other
provisions or sources of law, as are granted to and imposed upon spouses). Part (d) goes on
to expressly provide that: “The rights and obligations of registered domestic partners with
respect to a child of either of them shall be the same as those of spouses.” CAL. FAM. CODE §
297.5.
18. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 682 (Cal. 2005) (finding that a child
conceived by a lesbian couple, with one woman providing eggs which were in vitro
fertilized with donor sperm and implanted in the uterus of the other woman, was the
“natural” and legal child of both women).
19. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (distinguishing “traditional”
surrogacy, where a woman is impregnated with the sperm of a married man with an
understanding that the child will legally belong to the married man and his wife, from
“gestational” surrogacy, where the sperm of a married man is united with his wife’s egg,
and the resulting embryo is implanted in the uterus of another woman).
20. Id. at 900-01 (determining that, under Johnson v. Calvert, the intention of the
“parents” is only an issue if parentage cannot be determined by the terms of the Uniform
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Because there was no “tie” that needed breaking, procreative intent was
irrelevant. The court also chose to discount the fact that the “intended
mother” had raised the child from birth.21
This case, above all other ART cases I have found, illustrates the
downside of the position that children can have only two legal parents.
Marissa Moschetta was intentionally conceived by a married couple who
very much wanted her.22 However, the baby was the full biological child,
both genetically and gestationally, of the surrogate Elvira Jordan.23 To find
that Elvira Jordan had no legal rights would go against fundamental
principles of parentage and adoption, whereby a woman who gives birth to
her own genetic child is a full legal mother whose rights cannot be
terminated without her consent after the child is born, absent some clear
indication of unfitness.24 Yet when the Moschettas divorced, because the
child was only allowed two legal parents, the child lost all legal (and
actual) connection to Mrs. Moschetta, who had acted as her mother up to
that point. Instead, custody was divided between the husband and the
surrogate, who had no practical basis for sustaining a workable coparenting arrangement together.
And in fact, they did not sustain such a relationship. I have spoken to the
attorneys involved in the Moschetta case to learn the “story behind the
story.” After the court’s ruling, Mr. Moschetta took advantage of the class
and educational differences between himself and Elvira Jordan, forcing her
out of the picture and causing the child to lose contact with both mothers.25
Ultimately, the child was taken to another state to be parented solely by her
father.26 Interestingly, the wife and the surrogate ended up as allies in

Parentage Act, which California had codified, and that in this case the Uniform Parentage
Act provided an answer without considering intent).
21. Id. at 897 (discussing why receiving the child into the home of one of the women
does not necessarily make her the child’s presumed mother); see also In re Baby M., 537
A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988) (reaching a decision similar to that in Moschetta, by
determining that the husband/genetic father and the surrogate were the child’s legal parents
and awarding custody to the genetic father but providing visitation to the surrogate based on
her genetic and gestational relationship with the child).
22. See id. at 895 (discussing how, even after separating as a married couple, the child’s
parents—as well as the surrogate mother—all fought for custody of the child, leading to the
litigation).
23. Id. (discussing the “traditional” surrogacy procedure, wherein Elvira Jordan was
artificially inseminated with Robert Moschetta’s sperm using her own egg; thus, Jordan was
both the gestational and genetic mother of the child).
24. See id. at 894 (asserting that, in “traditional” surrogacy, the surrogate is both the
genetic mother—her egg is used—and gestational mother because she gave birth to the
child).
25. Telephone Interview with Leslee J. Newman, attorney for Cynthia

Moschetta (2005).
26. Id.
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trying to stop this from happening, but to no avail.27
How would young Marissa Moschetta’s life have been different had the
court ruled that she could have a legal relationship with Mr. Moschetta,
Mrs. Moschetta, and the surrogate who was her genetic and gestational
mother? It is, of course, impossible to know. But with the women having
a cooperative relationship and the husband not, the chances certainly are
much improved that Marissa would have ended up with more than one
functional parent. And what would have been the harm in such a finding?
Arguably, allowing more than two adults to petition the courts for
custody or visitation increases the odds of litigation and adds to the
complexity and contentiousness of whatever litigation does occur at the
expense of the children. But preventing all parties who have a parental
interest in the child from participating in custody litigation creates a
substantial risk that children’s most important relationships may be left
unprotected by the courts. In my assessment, this risk outweighs any
arguable benefits flowing from rigid adherence to a rule that only
recognizes the possibility of two legal parents in a child’s life.28
Ohio has taken a completely different philosophical approach to
determining parentage in the surrogacy context—albeit one that will often
result in the same outcome. Explicitly rejecting California’s intent-based
analysis as too confusing and prone to uncertainty but applying a much
more rigid and inflexible approach in its stead, Ohio has chosen to rely
exclusively on genetics, finding that: “The test to identify the natural
parents should be, ‘Who are the genetic parents?’”29 According to Ohio
law:
[W]hen a child is delivered by a gestational surrogate who has been
impregnated through the process of in vitro fertilization, the natural
parents of the child shall be identified by a determination as to which
individuals have provided the genetic imprint for that child. If the
individuals who have been identified as the genetic parents have not
relinquished or waived their rights to assume the legal status of natural
parents, they shall be considered the natural and legal parents of that
child.30

27. Id.
28. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3101(a) (2007) (differing from many states that have
laws that only allow the natural parents to have custody, and joining a number of states that
have case law and/or statutes allowing stepparents to obtain visitation if the court
determines that a continued relationship between the stepparent and the child is in the
child’s best interest); see also DivorceSource.com, Stepparent’s Right to Request Custody
or Visitation, http://www.divorcesource.com/tables/stepparentscustody.shtml (last visited
Jan. 21, 2007) (listing state statutes on custody and visitation rights of stepparents for all
fifty states and the District of Columbia).
29. Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54, 64 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pl. 1994).
30. See id. at 66.
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The Ohio approach may, at first glance, be attractive for its simplicity,
but the issue of what constitutes a valid waiver of rights by a genetic parent
in the context of ART cases can itself be complex. In K.M. v. E.G., a
lesbian couple conceived twins using K.M.’s eggs, which a medical center
fertilized in vitro with donor sperm and then implanted into E.G.’s womb.31
K.M. signed a standardized “egg donor consent” form at the hospital where
the procedure was done, by which she waived all parental rights to any
children conceived from her eggs.32 However, after the twins were born,
the two women brought the children home together and raised the children
together for five years.33
After dissolution of the partnership, E.G., the twins’ gestational mother
whose name appears on their birth certificates as a result of her having
given birth to them, alleged that K.M. was in fact only an egg donor,
having waived her parental rights by signing the medical consent form.34
Although she won this argument before the court of appeal,35 the California
Supreme Court rejected this logic and held that the usual rules for an egg or
sperm donor do not apply where the genetic mother “supplied ova to
impregnate her lesbian partner in order to produce children who would be
raised in their joint home.”36 The court ruled that both women were legal
parents.37
As K.M. v. E.G. illustrates, a rule based solely on genetics is inadequate
to deal with the variety and complexity of real-life situations. A further
example of this complexity is found in a Pennsylvania case, where an
unmarried heterosexual couple arranged to conceive with the assistance of
an egg donor and a gestational surrogate.38 However, the surrogacy
contract failed to specify who the legal mother would be and was signed by
31. 117 P.3d 673, 675 (Cal. 2005) (holding that when lesbian partners decide to have a
child, where one partner provides her ova and the other partner bears the child, both are the
child’s parents).
32. Id. at 675-76 (explaining the hotly contested dispute about whether K.M. in fact
intended to be an egg donor at the time the Medical Center retrieved her eggs, or whether
she intended to be a parent but was forced to sign the form because the clinic would not
perform the in vitro fertilization procedure without her signature).
33. Id. at 676-77 (stating that from December 1995 until September 2001 the children
lived with both K.M. and E.G., that two school forms listed both K.M. and E.G. as the
twins’ parents, and that the twins’ nanny testified that both children referred to K.M. and
E.G. as their mothers).
34. Id. at 676 (recounting E.G.’s testimony that she wanted to have a child of her own
and that without K.M. signing the consent form she would not have accepted K.M.’s ova).
35. Id. at 677.
36. Id. at 681 (declining to base the ruling on the intent of the parties at the time of
conception, as in Johnson v. Calvert, in addition to declining to rely on parental conduct,
and instead crafted a hybrid rule for this particular set of factual circumstances, whose
broader applicability is yet to be determined).
37. Id. at 675.
38. J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 3 (C.P. Ct. Erie County 2004).
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the biological father, the egg donor, the surrogate, and the surrogate’s
husband, but not by the biological father’s partner with whom the
biological father intended to raise the child.39 When the surrogate gave
birth to triplets, the couple who contracted for the babies initially failed to
follow through on their obligations with regard to the care and custody of
the premature newborns.40 The surrogate and her husband therefore
stepped in, ultimately taking the babies home from the hospital and caring
for them.41 The couple that originally arranged for the surrogacy contested
the surrogate’s parental rights based on her lack of a genetic connection to
the triplets.42
The Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania found that the surrogate
assumed the status of legal mother, despite having no genetic connection to
the babies and despite the fact that she clearly had no intent to parent them
at the time of their conception, by her conduct in gestating and caring for
the babies.43 As stated by the court:
A, B and C did not hatch, they were born. . . . D.B. [the surrogate] . . .
like E.D. [the father’s partner] is not genetically related to the triplets,
but carried them in her womb and then gave birth to them. Her every
decision prior to their birth has affected them—health, nutrition, prenatal
care, etc. In addition, she has not terminated any parental rights she may
have to the triplets. She has instead taken the triplets into her home and
cared for them along with her three other children. She is more a mother
and a parent by her actions than by genetics.44

Here the court gave more weight to parental conduct, including prenatal
parental conduct, than to either genetics or intent in establishing parentage.
An even greater level of complexity in determining legal parentage
occurs when a couple has used both an egg donor and a sperm donor in
their procreative process, and, therefore, they are not in any way
genetically related to the child. The most complex of these cases in the
United States comes from California.45 In In re Marriage of Buzzanca,
39. Id. at 4-5.
40. Id. at 5-6 (acknowledging that J.F. and E.D. did not bring the required court order,
which would give them legal custody of the triplets, to the medical center where the children
were born).
41. Id. at 7 (recounting that the surrogate mother’s concerns over the lack of visits from
the intended parents, the fact that the triplets were still nameless, and E.D.’s lie about
visiting the triplets convinced the surrogate to take the triplets to her home).
42. Id. at 9.
43. Id. at 24 (considering the surrogate’s decisions during pregnancy relating to health,
nutrition, and prenatal care, along with the fact that she did not terminate her parental rights
to the triplets enough to declare her the legal mother in this case).
44. Id. at 23-24.
45. In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(recounting the Buzzanca’s decision to have a genetically unrelated embryo implanted in a
surrogate; however after fertilization, implantation, and pregnancy, the Buzzancas
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John and Luanne Buzzanca wanted to have a child, but both were
infertile.46 They obtained eggs from an anonymous egg donor and used the
sperm of an anonymous sperm donor for in vitro fertilization, creating
embryos that were implanted into the womb of a married surrogate.47 The
resulting child, Jaycee, thus had six adults involved in her procreation: an
egg donor, a sperm donor, the Buzzancas as “intended parents,” the
surrogate, and the surrogate’s husband.48 However, while the surrogate
was still pregnant, the Buzzancas filed for divorce.49 In the dissolution
papers, Luanne Buzzanca indicated that the baby was a child of the
marriage; John Buzzanca indicated that there were no children of the
marriage, maintaining that he should not be held legally responsible for a
child that was not genetically his, was not genetically his wife’s, and was
not being gestated by his wife.50
The trial court agreed with John Buzzanca, finding that the baby had no
legal parents, a result compatible with the Ohio “pure genetics” approach
whereby John and Luanne Buzzanca would not be parents without a
genetic connection to the child, even if incompatible with the child’s best
interests or any definition of common sense.51 The court of appeal that
heard the case disagreed, finding that when a married couple, unable to
procreate without assistance, conceive a child through medical technology
with the intent to parent the child, they must be held to the status of legal
parents regardless of genetics.52 Buzzanca may be the ultimate illustration
of why a purely genetic model, such as that adopted by Ohio, will not work
in the age of modern reproductive technological advances.
The Tennessee Supreme Court recently grappled with these issues in a
case involving an unmarried heterosexual couple.53 The couple, Charles
and Cindy, decided to have children together.54 Due to Cindy’s age, which
rendered her own eggs unsuitable for procreation, they obtained
separated, creating a controversy over who Jaycee’s legal parents were. Neither the
surrogate nor Mr. Buzzanca made a claim to parentage of the child, while Mrs. Buzzanca
claimed that she and Mr. Buzzanca were the lawful parents).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 282-83 (noting that the child was born on April 26th, after Mr. Buzzanca filed
for divorce and Mrs. Buzzanca filed her response).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 291.
52. Id. at 293 (concluding that Mr. and Mrs. Buzzanca are the lawful parents of Jaycee
after considering the intent to parent as the ultimate basis of its decision, which correlates to
the child’s best interest).
53. In re C.K.G., C.A.G. & C.L.G., 173 S.W.3d 714 (Tenn. 2005).
54. Id. at 717 (informing that Cindy already had two adult children and grandchildren
from a previous marriage, while Charles was childless).
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anonymously donated eggs, fertilized them with Charles’ sperm, and then
implanted the embryos into Cindy’s uterus.55 As a result, Cindy became
pregnant with triplets.56 After she gave birth, the two adults and three
children lived together as a family for a period of time.57 However, the
adults’ relationship eventually deteriorated and Cindy filed a parentage
action seeking custody and child support.58 Charles responded that Cindy
was not a legal parent because she lacked any genetic connection with the
triplets.59
Noting that “recent developments in reproductive technology have
caused a tectonic shift in the realities which underlie our legal conceptions
of parenthood, . . . engender[ing] a bewildering variety of possibilities
which are not easily reconciled with our traditional definitions of ‘mother,’
‘father,’ and ‘parent,’”60 the Tennessee court reviewed both California’s
intent-based approach and Ohio’s genetics-based approach and declined to
purely follow either, instead creating a hybrid approach of their own.61 The
Tennessee court decided Charles and Cindy’s case on “particularly narrow
grounds,” focusing closely on the facts of the case and basing its decision
on a combination of: (1) the joint procreative intent of the parties prior to
the children’s conception and birth; (2) the fact of Cindy gave birth to the
three children as her own (as opposed to having birthed them for someone
else, as a surrogate); and (3) the lack of another party competing with
Cindy for the role of “mother.”62
The common thread in the California, Ohio, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
and Tennessee cases is that where the genetic parents were known and
intended to raise the child, they were found to be legal parents unless they
failed to follow through on their parental obligations (as in the
Pennsylvania case). It is only where the genetic parents were unknown
55. Id. at 717.
56. Id. at 718 (acknowledging that Charles intended for the couple to have one child,
but, to increase the chances of success, the fertility center used two eggs, one of which
divided resulting in triplets since all three embryos survived).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 718-19.
60. Id .at 721.
61. Id. at 726-30 (finding that “Tennessee’s statutory framework for establishing
maternity differs markedly from the California and Ohio statutes under consideration in
Johnson and Belsito. . . . Consequently, neither California’s intent test nor Ohio’s genetic
test is strictly apposite to our statutory scheme”).
62. Id. at 730 (limiting their holding to cases where there is no controversy between the
gestator and the genetic mother). This issue of whether or not there is anyone else
competing for a parental role has been a factor favoring expanding definitions of parentage
in a number of cases, especially where more traditional definitions of “parent” would either
leave a child parentless or would leave a child with only one parent where two parents are
actually available. Id.
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(being anonymous egg or sperm donors) that intent became a significant
and distinct factor. But the cases show courts’ growing inclination to factor
intent into the parentage analysis where procreation is the result of highly
intentional conduct, such as in cases involving assisted reproductive
technologies. The courts also are showing a willingness to look at parental
conduct both before and after birth as relevant to the core parentage
determination. This opens the door to the possibility that where intent is
murky, where there is a clear intent to share parentage among more than
two adults, or where the genetics, intent, and conduct are distributed among
more than two parties, courts may soon begin to recognize three-parent
families for children conceived through the use of reproductive
technologies.63
B. Children Conceived by Same-Sex Couples
While cases involving same-sex parents clearly overlap with other ART
cases (e.g., K.M. v. E.G., discussed above with regard to the relevance of a
signed medical waiver, which involved a lesbian couple using in vitro
fertilization to conceive a child), I have chosen to discuss them separately
because the courts have generally treated ART cases involving same-sex
couples differently from ART cases involving different-sex couples. This
difference in treatment is attributable to some combination of institutional
discomfort with same-sex families and concern over the implications of
recognizing two mothers or two fathers for the same child.
In most of the cases discussed above, heterosexual couples unable to
conceive without medical assistance chose to use reproductive technologies
to procreate. And, as noted, in each case only two persons intended to be
parents. However, when same-sex couples choose to procreate, the
biological realities of conception mean that they need some assistance. It is
also more common for them to intentionally involve more than two known
adults in this process.
Appellate courts in approximately twenty states have addressed the issue
of whether the same-sex partner of a lesbian mother has a right to petition
for joint custody and/or visitation, where the partner has lived with the
family and stood in the role of a parent for a significant period of time but
has not established a legal parent-child relationship with the child. At least
thirteen of those states have awarded some degree of parental rights to nonbiological lesbian mothers, relying on a variety of theories including
psychological parenthood, de facto parenthood, in loco parentis, and
equitable parenthood.64
63. See Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, 117 P.3d. 660, 665 (Cal. 2005)
(acknowledging that the lack of a judicial opinion recognizing a “legislative policy limiting
a child to two parents” could potentially lead to a child having more than two parents).
64. Deborah Wald, California is Behind the Times when it Comes to Granting Custody
to Same-Sex Parents, L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 5, 2004, available at http://waldlaw.net
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The leading national standard for determining when a non-biological
mother should have continued access to a child born to a lesbian couple
comes from Wisconsin.65 The test established by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court follows:
To demonstrate the existence of the petitioner’s parent-like relationship
with the child, the petitioner must prove four elements: (1) that the
biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the petitioner’s
formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child;
(2) that the petitioner and the child lived together in the same household;
(3) that the petitioner assumed the obligations of parenthood by taking
significant responsibility for the child’s care, education and
development, including contributing towards the child’s support, without
expectation of financial compensation; and (4) that the petitioner has
been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established
with the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature.66

This standard has been followed in a number of other states. For
example, in a lesbian custody dispute where the non-biological mother had
not adopted the child, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the nonbiological mother as a psychological parent.67 The court identified a
“psychological parent” as:
[O]ne who, on a day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship,
interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child’s psychological need for an
adult. This adult becomes an essential focus of the child’s life, for he
[sic] is not only the source of the fulfillment of the child’s physical
needs, but also the source of his emotional and psychological needs.68

In concluding that courts must protect a child’s relationship with a
psychological parent, the New Jersey court cited what it termed the
“thoughtful and inclusive definition of de facto parenthood” enunciated by
Wisconsin.69 The New Jersey court reiterated the standard, holding that:
/published_articles.html (identifying Colorado, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin
among the thirteen states which have awarded or considered awarding custody and/or
visitation rights in lesbian custody disputes).
65. Id. (stating that the New Jersey court has described the elements laid out by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court as “the thoughtful and inclusive definition of de facto
parenthood.”).
66. Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995) (establishing the elements
necessary to prove the existence of a parent-like relationship with a child when considering
a non-custodial parent’s visitation rights).
67. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 555 (N.J. 2000) (holding that the non-biological
parent is recognized as a psychological parent after application of the four Wisconsin
factors).
68. Id. at 551 (quoting Carter v. Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850, 853 n.2 (Alaska 1982)).
69. Id. (stating that the definition appeases the concerns of governmental bodies in
determining the concept of a psychological parent (citing Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 421)).
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[T]he legal parent must consent to and foster the relationship between
the third party and the child; the third party must have lived with the
child; the third party must perform parental functions for the child to a
significant degree; and most important, a parent-child bond must be
forged. We are satisfied that that test provides a good framework for
determining psychological parenthood in cases where the third party has
lived for a substantial period with the legal parent and her child.70

More recently, the Colorado Court of Appeals found that the former
domestic partner of a child’s legal mother had standing to seek joint
custody based on her status as the child’s psychological parent, even
though she had no legally recognized relationship with either the legal
parent or the child.71 The court found that “proof that a fit parent’s exercise
of parental responsibilities poses actual or threatened emotional harm to the
child establishes a compelling state interest sufficient to permit state
interference with parental rights” and concluded that “emotional harm to a
young child is intrinsic in the termination or significant curtailment of the
child’s relationship with a psychological parent . . . .”72 The court further
noted that even though the legal mother had a constitutionally protected
parental right and her ex-partner did not, the State of Colorado had a
compelling state interest in protecting the child from the harm that would
result from termination of her relationship with her psychological parent.73
Other states have reached similar conclusions. In T.B. v. L.R.M, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the lesbian former partner of a
child’s biological mother could seek partial custody and visitation based on
her standing in loco parentis to the child.74 In this case, the biological
mother argued that her ex-partner did not have standing to seek visitation
because she had not adopted their child.75 The court responded that a
biological parent’s rights “‘do not extend to erasing a relationship between
her partner and her child which she voluntarily created and actively
fostered simply because after the parties’ separation she regretted having
done so.’”76
70. Id. at 551-52.
71. See In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 553 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (applying the
Colorado General Assembly’s psychological parenting approach narrowly due to the use of
a strict scrutiny analysis, which is necessary in situations involving the fundamental rights
of individuals).
72. Id. at 558, 561 (concluding that the significance of possible emotional harm to a
child due to a curtailing of contact with a non-biological parent is great and warrants an
interference by the court).
73. Id. at 561.
74. 786 A.2d 913, 914 (Pa. 2001) (determining that the evidence presented
demonstrated that the non-biological parent assumed a parental role which gave them
standing in seeking visitation rights).
75. Id. at 915.
76. Id. at 918 (quoting J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996));
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Missouri has also granted visitation rights to the lesbian ex-partner of a
biological mother, noting that “[a]n award of custody or visitation to a nonbiological parent necessarily affects the biological parent’s rights of
control, but a child is a person and not chattel over which a biological
parent has an absolute possessory interest.”77 The court made numerous
findings, including that “[c]ourts must re-examine the theory that a child
may have only biological parents and adopt a more flexible ‘functional
approach,’ as opposed to the traditional, stricter, ‘formal approach,’ for
defining family.”78 On this basis, the court adopted the doctrine of
“equitable parent,” which it found “analogous to the doctrine of ‘equitable
adoption.’”79 The court then applied this doctrine to the facts before it and
found that the ex-partner had established herself as the equitable parent of
the child and was therefore entitled to shared custody and visitation.80
In states such as those discussed above, which have taken the step of
recognizing a child’s relationship with a functional or de facto parent over
the objections of the legal parent, it is interesting to consider what would
happen in the case of a lesbian couple with a known sperm donor, who
actively fostered a strong, parental bond between their child and the donor
for a period of years, arguably bringing him within the bounds of the
Wisconsin test. Granted, in most such cases, the donor could not meet the
“lived with the child” prong of the tests enunciated by Wisconsin and New
Jersey, making his role distinguishable from that of the mother’s partner.
However, in a case where the donor actually lived with the family, it seems
that it would be appropriate to use these same standards to determine
whether the child has two, three, or, if the donor’s partner is also involved
as a parent, even four parents. If the donor could meet the Wisconsin test,
it would be arguable that he should have the same degree of legal rights—
to seek custody and/or visitation—as does the second parent.81
Concerns about the prospect of recognizing three legal parents for
see also L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (holding that the rights and
responsibilities that arise out of the relationship between a non-biological parent, who
assumes the obligations of raising a child, and a child, are the same as the biological parent).
77. In re T.L., No. 953-2340, 1996 WL 393521, at *3 (Mo. Cir. Ct. May 7, 1996)
(determining whether a parent can choose at will when to remove parental rights from a
non-biological parent).
78. Id. at *2.
79. Id. (defining an equitable parent as one who retains custody of a child for an
extended period of time, demonstrates a genuine concern for the child’s well-being, and
developed a relationship with the child under the direction of the biological parent).
80. Id. at *2-3.
81. If the lesbian couple has fostered a long-term parental relationship between the
donor and the child where the child has spent substantial time with the donor from birth, the
child considers him a father, and the donor has contributed to the child’s support, even
though the donor never lived with the child so that the Wisconsin test would not strictly
apply, I would argue that the donor should have an enforceable right to visitation.
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children being raised by their mother, their mother’s partner, and their
donor/father, are threefold:
(1)

An argument can be made that recognizing more than two
parents is against public policy, undermining the traditional
nuclear family;

(2)

As mentioned earlier, many courts are concerned that
recognizing parentage in more than two adults will lead to more
frequent and complex custody battles, or at least create the
opportunity for more adults to initiate custody actions; and

(3)

To recognize more than two parents for a child may undermine
the legal rights of fit parents to determine with whom their
children will associate, in violation of the United States
Constitution.82

Although these are serious concerns, refusing to consider the possibility of
finding a parent-child relationship between a child and the person who has
raised that child elevates principles over practice, trivializing the reality
that the loss of a parental relationship can cause devastating harm to a
child.
The importance of allowing the courts to consider establishing parentage
in adults who would not traditionally have been considered parents is
exemplified by a West Virginia case in which a child was born to his
mother and her same-sex partner, using sperm of a known donor who was
legally recognized as the child’s father.83 The couple, Tina and Christina,
planned the birth of Z.B.S. and enlisted the involvement of Clifford K[.]
only for the purpose of impregnating Christina [S]. It was their apparent
intention together to raise Z.B.S. . . . as a “family” unit . . . . Although he
[Clifford] has had contact with Z.B.S. since the child’s birth, he has
performed limited care-giving functions and his planned as well as actual
involvement with the child has been limited.84

The two women and the child lived together as a family for

82. See Troxel v. Granville 530 U.S. 57, 61 (2000) (invalidating the Washington
visitation statute which provided that: “Any person may petition the court for visitation
rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may order
visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interests of the
child . . .”). In that case, the mother had reduced the paternal grandparents’ visitation with
the child following the father’s death, so the paternal grandparents sued. Id. at 60-62. The
Court found that the superior court’s order awarding additional visitation to the grandparents
“was an unconstitutional infringement on Granville’s fundamental right to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of her two daughters.” Id. at 71.
83. See In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138, 144 (W. Va. 2005).
84. Id. at 158.
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approximately two and a half years.85 Then, after Christina’s untimely
death, a custody battle developed between Tina (the partner) and
Christina’s parents, in which Clifford, the donor/father, lent his support to
Tina.86 Although Tina clearly was not the child’s parent by birth or
adoption under West Virginia law, the court nevertheless found Tina to be
the child’s “psychological parent” and awarded her custody.87 In finding in
Tina’s favor, the West Virginia court noted that:
In the law concerning custody of minor children, no rule is more firmly
established than that the right of a natural parent to the custody of his or
her infant child is paramount to that of any other person; it is a
fundamental personal liberty protected and guaranteed by the Due
Process Clauses of the West Virginia and United States
Constitutions. . . . For this reason, the limited rights of a psychological
parent cannot ordinarily trump those of a biological or adoptive parent to
the care, control, and custody of his/her child. Nonetheless we hold that,
in exceptional cases and subject to the court’s discretion, a psychological
parent may intervene in a custody proceeding brought pursuant to [West
Virginia statutes] when such intervention is likely to serve the best
interests of the child(ren) whose custody is under adjudication.88

The court went on to conclude that the best interests of the child in this
“very unusual and extraordinary” case required that custody be awarded to
Tina, the non-biological “psychological” mother.89
By way of contrast, the Vermont case of Titchenal v. Dexter, which
predates Vermont’s Civil Union statute, illustrates a court refusing to
extend parentage to the ex-partner of a lesbian mother out of concern for
broader policy ramifications.90 In this case, a lesbian couple adopted an
infant after they failed to conceive via artificial insemination.91 Based on
their understanding of Vermont law at the time, only one legally adopted
the child, and the other mother remained a non-legal parent; however, they
gave the child a surname comprised of their hyphenated last names, they

85. Id. at 144.
86. Id. (noting that Clifford K.’s initial petition for custody was on behalf of Tina B.
and not for his own purposes).
87. Id. (finding that the “caretaking” responsibilities that Tina S. provided to the child
were so significant that it formed the basis for her consideration as a psychological parent).
88. Id. at 157 (quoting In re Willis, 207 S.E.2d 129, (W. Va. 1973)).
89. Id. at 157-59.
90. See 693 A.2d 682, 690 (Vt. 1997) (holding that the legislature did not create a
system that grants visitation rights to third parties, and, thus, any court that grants visitation
rights to third parties would be going above and beyond the scope of the Legislature). This
case would be decided differently now, at least under circumstances where the women had
entered into a civil union, since children born into a Vermont lesbian civil union are
presumed to be the children of both mothers.
91. Id. at 683.
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held themselves out to the child and the world as equal parents, the child
called each woman “Mama,” and for the first three and a half years of the
child’s life her non-adoptive mother cared for her approximately sixty-five
percent of the time.92 Following their separation, they shared custody for
another five months before the adoptive mother reduced visitation with the
non-adoptive mother and refused financial assistance from her former
partner.93 Subsequently, the non-adoptive mother sued for shared custody
and/or visitation as a de facto parent.94 The case wound its way to the
Supreme Court of Vermont, which ultimately rejected the non-adoptive
parent’s suit, finding no “underlying legal basis for plaintiff’s cause of
action that would allow the superior court to apply its equitable powers to
adjudicate her claim. . . . Notwithstanding plaintiff’s claims to the contrary,
there is no common-law history of Vermont courts interfering with the
rights and responsibilities of fit parents absent statutory authority to do
so.”95
Invoking a common, albeit illogical, “slippery slope” argument, the court
asserted that if the non-adoptive mother were allowed visitation through
court intervention, it would open the door to “various relatives, foster
parents, and even day-care providers” seeking visitation against a fit
parent’s wishes, or it would encourage abuse of the court system by third
parties seeking court-ordered visitation as a means of harassing the legal
parents or forcing continuation of an unwanted relationship.96 The
Vermont court concluded that if the pool of persons who could seek courtordered visitation was to be expanded, it was for the legislature to make
this choice and not the courts.97
The issue of how best to protect the autonomy of fit parents, while also
protecting children raised in non-traditional families from “parentectomies”
when their sole legal parent decides unilaterally to terminate their
relationship with another parent, is complex, and there are no easy answers.
However, it is clear that children need the courts to take a more functional
approach to defining the parent-child relationship, so as to protect children
from losing parents solely because the children were born into families the
legislatures may not have previously envisioned.
In some of the same-sex cases that come through my law practice,
lesbian couples are choosing to use friends as sperm donors expressly for
the purpose of making sure their children have a bonded, loving

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 684-85.
Id. at 688.
Id. at 689.
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relationship with their biological father. Likewise gay male couples are
choosing to use friends as surrogates for the purpose of making sure their
children have a bonded, loving relationship with their biological mother. In
some of these cases, the intent of the child-seeking couple is that they be
sole legal parents with an amicable relationship with the other biological
parent. But in others, it is the intent of all parties that the children have a
genuine parent-child relationship with all three adults involved in their
conception: the biological mother, the biological father, and the partner of
the one who will be primary parent. Clearly, there could be four functional
parents under this model, if both the biological mother and the biological
father are in committed relationships, and all four intend to be parents.
This highly intentional, procreative conduct by more than two adults cannot
be taken lightly as we review and redefine the term “parent” to comport
more closely with modern realities.
II. ESTABLISHING PARENTAGE FOR CHILDREN BORN AS A RESULT OF
EXTRA-MARITAL AFFAIRS
Another series of cases crying out for solutions that acknowledge the
possibility of children having more than two parents are those involving
children born as a result of extra-marital affairs. They add marital
presumptions to the mix of factors a court must weigh. In many of these
cases, married mothers give birth to children while living with boyfriends,
and the children live with and are encouraged to bond with the boyfriend,
who may or may not be the genetic father, for some period of time before
their mothers reunite with the mothers’ husbands, who then want to claim
the children as their own based on traditional marital presumptions. The
public policy issues are complex: do we support the child’s right to a
relationship with its functional and/or genetic father at the expense of the
marital family, or do we support the married couple who wants to live as a
nuclear family at the expense of the child having a relationship with its
functional and/or genetic father?
Unlike most of the other areas discussed in this article, the United States
Supreme Court has weighed in on these cases. The Supreme Court has
indicated, in more than one case, that an unwed father has a constitutional
right to maintain a legal relationship with his child if the man has taken
responsibility for the child and has an actual “substantial” relationship with
the child.98 In other words, for unwed fathers genetics is not enough. For
the man to have a parental claim, he must show genetics plus parental
conduct. The Court has also approved the conclusive presumption that a
98. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (identifying parental relationships as
being more of an enduring relationship rather than only a biological relationship between a
parent and a child).
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child born into a marital home is a child of the marriage, whether or not the
husband actually is the genetic father.99
The Supreme Court wrestled with the issue of what to do when the
mother is married, but the child also has a “substantial” relationship with
the non-husband genetic father in Michael H. v. Gerald D.100 In a 1989
opinion, the Court decided that it was constitutional for the State of
California to determine that the marital presumption precluded a genetic
father, who had lived with and parented a child for some period of time,
from establishing legal parentage.101 This case was decided by a plurality
of the Court, however, with five separate opinions filed by the nine
Justices, indicating how unsettled the law is in this area.102
California has two interesting court of appeal decisions on this issue,
both of which point to complexities involved in resolving these disputes,
and both of which were ultimately decided based on the extent of bonding,
functional parenting, and the best interests of the child. In Steven W. v.
Matthew S., Julie was married to Matthew.103 In 1986, she moved out of
their marital home and moved in with Steven.104 She told Steven she was
divorcing Matthew, but she secretly maintained an intimate relationship
with Matthew on the side.105 In 1987, she talked with both Steven and
Matthew about having a child, neither man knowing she was talking with
the other.106 In May 1987, she became pregnant while on a weekend tryst
with Matthew (her husband).107 However, she continued to live with
Steven, and she told both men that they were the father.108 Steven went
99. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(identifying an interest in promoting civility and tranquility in families by asserting a
father’s right to establish parental rights over a third party).
100. Id. at 124 (finding that the government’s interest in maintaining the marital family
outweighs a biological father’s liberty interest in rearing his own child).
101. Id. at 125 (suggesting that the biological father failed to meet his burden of proof
because history and precedent all indicated that the state’s public interest in protecting the
marital family far outweighed the biological father private interest in establishing a
relationship with his child).
102. See, e.g., id. at 133-34 (Stevens, J., concurring) (holding that the biological interest
does not outweigh the state’s interest in maintaining the marital family but also reminding
the parties that the biological father may possess reasonable visitation rights because he is
an “‘other person having an interest in the welfare of the child’” (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE §
4601 (West 1989))). But see id. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (condemning the plurality
for its failure to recognize that the modern-day family structure is malleable, and, therefore,
the Court should recognize that the biological father possesses a liberty interest in regards to
his child).
103. 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 535, 536 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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through the pregnancy and childbirth with Julie, fed, bathed, and cared for
baby Michael.109 Matthew did not see Michael until he was several months
old.110 Julie, Steven, and Michael lived together as a family until 1990,
when Steven discovered that Julie was still seeing Matthew.111 Steven
moved out but continued to share custody and support of Michael, and, in
December 1990, he filed a court action asserting his legal paternity.112 In
her response to the action, Julie admitted that Steven was Michael’s
father.113 Matthew defaulted.114 However, Matthew subsequently moved
for relief from default and, in April 1992, the judgment was set aside.115
Blood tests at that time showed Matthew (the husband) to be Michael’s
biological father.116
In this case, both Matthew and Steven qualified as presumed fathers
under the Uniform Parentage Act,117 Matthew was married to the child’s
mother at the time of birth, and Steven received the child into his home and
held him out as his natural child. The court of appeal resolved these
conflicting presumptions in favor of preserving the extant, functional
father-child relationship between Steven and Michael.118 As stated by the
court:
[I]n the case of an older child [over two years of age] the familial
relationship between the child and the man purporting to be the child’s
father is considerably more palpable than the biological relationship of
actual paternity. A man who has lived with a child, treating it as his son
or daughter, has developed a relationship with the child that should not
be lightly dissolved. . . . This social relationship is much more important,
to the child at least, than a biological relationship of actual paternity.119

In other words, in a victory for the functional approach to defining
parentage, Julie’s boyfriend was found to be the legal father in preference
over Julie’s husband who was the biological father of the child.

109. Id. at 536-37.
110. Id. at 537.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7611(a), 7611(d) (2007) (setting the standards, conditions,
and presumptions a court may utilize when determining the natural parentage of a child).
118. Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 538 (quoting Susan H. v. Jack S., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d
120, 125 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)) (finding that social policy favors maintaining an ongoing
father-child relationship because it protects a child’s emotional stability).
119. Id. at 549 (quoting Susan H. v. Jack S., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120, 125 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994) (quoting Estate of Cornelious, 35 Cal. 3d 461, 465-466 (1984)).
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(Presumably, were Julie and Matthew to separate again, Matthew would be
entitled to visitation as a stepfather under California’s stepparent visitation
statute, if such visitation were shown to be in Michael’s best interest.)120
In the second case, Craig L. v. Sandy S., Sandy was married to Brian,
and Craig was a close family friend.121 Sandy and Craig had a brief sexual
relationship.122 In February 2001, Sandy became pregnant and delivered a
baby she and Brian named Jeffrey.123 All the involved parties believed that
Brian was Jeffrey’s father until routine neonatal blood tests performed at
the hospital immediately following Jeffrey’s birth eliminated Brian as a
possible biological father for Jeffrey.124 At this point, Sandy admitted the
affair to Brian and explained that Craig was the only other possible
biological father.125 The disclosure led to a brief separation, but the couple
and baby were eventually reunited as a family in the marital home.126
However, Craig and his wife Kathryn participated in Jeffrey’s life in the
following ways: Craig signed a support agreement and made support
payments to Sandy; when Sandy returned to work, Kathryn took care of
Jeffrey three to four days per week in her and Craig’s home; and when
Jeffrey was a few months old the families initiated one overnight visit per
week between Jeffrey, Craig, and Kathryn.127 Although Sandy and Brian
disputed this fact, Craig asserted that he held Jeffrey out to his family and
friends as his natural son.128 Then, on March 31, 2003, Sandy sent Craig an
e-mail advising him that she and Brian no longer needed the “childcare
services” that Craig and Kathryn had been providing.129
Craig filed a petition with the court to establish his status as Jeffrey’s
father based on his having brought Jeffrey into his home and held Jeffrey
out as his natural child; Brian responded that because he was Sandy’s
husband at the time of Jeffrey’s conception and birth, he was Jeffrey’s
presumed father under the marital presumption.130 The trial court ruled in
120. See CAL. FAM. CODE §3101(a) (2007) (providing that, after considering all the
factors of the stepparent-child relationship, a court may grant reasonable visitation rights to
a stepparent so long as it is in the best interests of the child).
121. 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 606, 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. (noting that, almost immediately after he filed his § 7611(d) claim for status as
Jeffrey’s natural father, Craig motioned for a temporary order that would allow him to visit
Jeffrey); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (2007) (establishing that a court may find a
man the natural father of a child if he welcomes the child into his home and he openly holds
the child out to the public as his natural child).
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favor of Brian, noting:
There is a strong public policy in California to maintain the integrity of
the unitary family and the welfare of Jeffrey requires a concern for
Jeffrey’s perceived legitimacy. The court finds that pursuant to Statute,
Decisional Law, and California’s strong public policy to maintain the
integrity of a child’s legitimacy, Craig does not have standing to
establish a paternal relationship.131

The trial court also refused Craig’s motion for DNA testing to establish his
genetic link to Jeffrey, and Craig appealed.132
On review, the court of appeal found that Craig had standing to pursue
his paternity claim based on his factual assertion that he met the definitions
of a presumed father under the “holding out” provisions of the Uniform
Parentage Act.133 The court also found that Brian had standing to pursue a
paternity claim based on the marital presumptions.134 Finally, the court
found that there is no statutory preference between these two claims.135 As
stated by the court of appeal, “we have found no case which holds that . . .
the state’s interest in marriage will always outweigh the interests of a man
and a child with whom the man has established a paternal relationship.”136
The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the nature of Craig’s
actual relationship with Jeffrey and to weigh that relationship against the
interests embodied in Brian’s status as Sandy’s husband and his
relationship with Jeffrey.137 “[I]n weighing the conflicting interests . . . the
trial court must in the end make a determination which gives the greatest
weight to Jeffrey’s well being.”138
131. Id. at 609 (stating that the trial court found that Craig did not have standing to assert
a natural father claim because California’s social policy dictates maintaining the traditional
marital home); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d).
132. Id. at 609 (detailing that, because the trial court determined that Craig lacked
standing to assert his natural father claim, it also found that it was unnecessary to address
both Craig’s request for DNA testing and his temporary visitation).
133. Id. (analogizing Craig’s frequent contact with Jeffrey to the precedent case in which
a biological father received his son into his home every weekend and, therefore, the court
found he had standing to assert a natural father claim).
134. Id. at 610 (explaining that Brian could pursue a natural parent claim under both
California Family Code § 7540 and the broader provisions of § 7611(a) because he was
married to and living with Sandy); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (2007) (mandating the
conclusive presumption that a child of a wife living with her husband is a child of the
marriage so long as the husband is not sterile); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(a) (2005)
(establishing the rebuttable marital presumption which grants natural father status to the
husband of the child’s natural mother so long as the child was born during the marriage).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 614.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 615 (concluding that, on remand, the trial court must consider several factors,
such as the nature of Craig’s father-son relationship with Jeffrey and the impact of
acknowledging Craig’s paternity will have on Jeffrey, before determining whether Brian or
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The importance of assigning legal paternity to someone becomes
particularly clear in cases where men who believed themselves to be the
genetic fathers of the children they raised later turn out not to be. There are
many such cases around the country, and they are becoming increasingly
controversial as some of these men fight to be relieved of support
obligations for children who are not genetically theirs. However, many
other men who are found not to be genetic fathers of children they have
raised want to continue in the paternal role, and most states reviewing these
cases have ruled they should be permitted to do so.
For example, in Atkinson v. Atkinson, the Court of Appeals of Michigan
found that a husband who was proven during divorce proceedings not to be
the biological father of his wife’s minor child, whom he had parented for
over three years, could nevertheless be found to be the child’s legal parent
over the mother’s objection.139 In making this finding, the Michigan court
relied on a theory of equitable parenthood.140 As stated by the Michigan
court:
[A] husband who is not the biological father of a child born or conceived
during the marriage may be considered the natural father of that child
where (1) the husband and the child mutually acknowledge a relationship
as father and child, or the mother of the child has cooperated in the
development of such a relationship over a period of time prior to the
filing of the complaint for divorce, (2) the husband desires to have the
rights afforded to a parent, and (3) the husband is willing to take on the
responsibility of paying child support.141

In a comparable case, Wisconsin reached a similar result while explicitly
rejecting the doctrine of “equitable” parenthood.142 That case involved a
child (Selena) born to a married Wisconsin woman as the result of an affair
she was having while “on business” in another state.143 The mother Norma
raised the child with her husband Randy.144 Randy did not discover that he
was not Selena’s biological father until he initiated divorce proceedings
after Norma was incarcerated for embezzlement.145 As recited by the
Craig is Jeffrey’s natural father). According to counsel for the case, Craig and his wife
subsequently abandoned Craig’s parentage claim, believing that the litigation was not in
anyone’s best interest.
139. 408 N.W.2d 516 (1987).
140. Id. at 519.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Randy A.J. v. Norma I.J., 677 N.W.2d 630, 642 (Wis. 2004) (rejecting the
Michigan Supreme Court’s equitable parent doctrine because it is not a long-standing legal
doctrine and precluding the Wisconsin lower courts from applying the doctrine when
deciding child custody cases).
143. Id. at 632.
144. Id. at 633-34.
145. Id. at 634.
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Wisconsin Supreme Court:
Randy and Norma lived together as husband and wife when Selena was
born. Randy has provided for Selena since her birth, emotionally and
financially. He has made a home for her and provided her with the status
of a marital child for six years, while [the biological father] has been
uninvolved in providing for her daily needs. Accordingly, we conclude
that [the biological father] has not demonstrated a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in his putative paternity because he has failed to
establish a substantial relationship with Selena.146

The court found that Randy was Selena’s legal father based on Wisconsin’s
marital presumptions but declined to adopt the equitable parent doctrine as
many other states have done “because its parameters are too indistinct,
permitting its use to create uncertainties in the law.”147
All of the extra-marital cases discussed thus far have turned on the best
interests of the children involved. By way of contrast, in Petition of Ash,
the Iowa Supreme Court found that a man, who lived with and raised the
child along with the mother, bathed, fed, and changed her diapers as a
baby, and provided ongoing psychological, emotional, and financial
support, including paying school tuition and providing health and dental
insurance for the child as she matured, was nevertheless a legal stranger to
the child with no right to custody or visitation.148 As stated by that court:
[I]n the legal sense, James is a stranger to the child. He is an interested
third party. He is not the child’s biological father. He is not her adopted
father. He is not her stepfather. He is not her foster parent. He never
married the child’s mother. . . . He is merely a man who lived with—and
cared for—her mother, and who, understandably, became smitten with
fatherhood after the child’s birth. . . . It is apparent that James loves the
child. He treats her like his daughter. He has, since her birth, assumed
the responsibilities and—until his visitation was cut off—enjoyed the
privileges of fatherhood. Up to the time visitation was interrupted,
James and the child unquestionably enjoyed an appropriate, nurturing,
father-daughter relationship. . . . Nevertheless, James has no legal basis
for asserting parental status.149

Therefore, James was denied any future contact with the child except at the
whim of the mother.150
146. Id. at 638 (comparing Randy’s substantial father-daughter relationship to Norma’s
lover’s nonexistent parent-child relationship to find that Norma’s lover did not have a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in his putative paternity, and, thereby, affirming
the lower court’s judgment insofar as Randy is the legal father of Selena).
147. Id. at 642.
148. 507 N.W.2d 400 (Iowa 1993).
149. Id at 404.
150. Id (refusing to grant the man any legal parent status because there were no statutes
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There are many court decisions, such as the ones cited above, that offer
examples of the complexities found when children are conceived during
extra-marital affairs. When read together, it is clear that the purely genetic
approach of states such as Ohio and Iowa cannot adequately protect
children who only have two parents, much less protect children in more
complicated situations. In other states, where courts take intention and
conduct into account along with genetics, children’s needs are more likely
to be met. This includes children with two functional parents, as well as
those children who may have more than two parents through intent and/or
parental conduct.
III. MAKING THE CASE FOR THREE-PARENT FAMILIES
I have encountered few published cases from around the country where
courts have recognized more than two legal parents. However, select trial
courts in California have allowed what we refer to as “third parent
adoptions” in circumstances where a lesbian couple conceive a child with a
known sperm donor who remains in the picture and acts as a father to the
child, on the condition that the child is at least five years of age and the
parties can show full bonding of the child with all three parents plus a good
co-parenting arrangement among the adults.151 I am personally aware of at
least two comparable “third parent” adoptions having been granted in
Massachusetts, and there have been several granted in Alaska and
Washington.152 In addition, a trial court in Pennsylvania recently granted
de facto parent status and the accompanying rights to visitation and shared
custody to the lesbian ex-partner of a woman who married after leaving the

nor common law theories that buttressed his paternity claim).
151. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 680-81 (Cal. 2005) (reversing a California
appellate court decision to deny a lesbian woman legal parent status because the lesbian
woman supplied the ova that resulted in the birth of twins, and, under the Model Uniform
Parentage Act, consanguinity constitutes evidence of a mother-and-child relationship). But
see Georgina G. v. Terry M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 684 (Wis. 1994) (mandating a “cut-off”
provision for the state’s adoption statute and preventing a lesbian woman from adopting her
partner’s biological child because a recognition of third parent could result in the
recognition of several other parents if there are multiple marriages). Similarly, other courts
have declined to do so on the grounds that they just would be setting children up for uglier,
more complex custody litigation in the occasion of a disagreement among the various
parents.
152. See, e.g., In re Susan, 619 N.E.2d 323, 324 (Mass. 1993) (stating that the female
partner of a lesbian woman should be able to adopt the woman’s biological child because
the plain language of the adoption statute did not restrict same-sex adoption); In re Tammy,
619 N.E.2d 315, 320-21 (Mass. 1993) (reasoning that, because the lesbian partner provided
financial and emotional support for the child, she should be permitted to adopt the biological
daughter of her partner because it was in the best interest of the child for her to legally
maintain both mother-daughter relationships). Information on where third parent adoptions
have occurred is obtained directly from the attorneys who have handled these adoptions and
from meetings of the National Family Law Advisory Council of the National Center for
Lesbian Rights.
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partnership and whose husband had adopted the child. This provided the
child with a legally protected relationship with her biological mother, her
biological mother’s husband, and her biological mother’s ex-partner, with
whom the child had a substantial, well established parent-child
relationship.153
In a case that has received international attention, the Ontario Court of
Appeal in Toronto recently ruled that a child born there has three legal
parents. In this case, a lesbian couple had a child with a man who provided
his sperm on the condition that he could play a meaningful role in the
child’s life.154 When the child was born, the biological mother and the
biological father were listed on the birth certificate; and the highest court in
Ontario unanimously ruled in January 2007 that the biological mother’s
partner was also the child’s legal parent in addition to the biological mother
and father, giving the child a legal father and two legal mothers.155
The possibility that it may be in a child’s best interests to preserve
parental relationships with more than two adults also arises in cases
involving less intentional conduct than what is involved in the ART and
same-sex cases. For example, in McDaniels v. Carson, the Supreme Court
of Washington reviewed a paternity action brought where a child’s mother
had alternately cohabited with two men, to one of whom she had been
married for some of the time, and either of whom could be the child’s
biological father.156 The child had a substantial parent-child relationship
with each man.157 In resolving the case, the court allowed a paternity
action by the non-husband, but it stated:
[I]n light of [the child’s] strong relationship with both appellant and
respondent and the genuineness of their affection, we accept the
recommendation of the guardian ad litem that . . . it would be in [the
child’s] best interest to preserve her relationship with each. Regardless
of the outcome of the paternity determination, either party will be
entitled to petition the trial court for visitation rights.158

Interestingly, courts examining the legality of “second parent” adoptions,
where the partner of a legal parent adopts the child they are raising together
153. See, e.g., KDP v. TPW, Court of Common Pleas of Montour County, Pennsylvania,
No. 192 of 2004, Opinion of June 25, 2004 (finding that the lesbian ex-partner of a child’s
biological mother—who had not been given notice or an opportunity to be heard at the
proceeding where the mother’s new husband adopted the child—had standing to proceed
with a custody action for the child with whom she had resided in a parent-child relationship
for over four years based on her in loco parentis relationship with the child).
154. A.A. v. B.B., [2007] O.A.C. 5.
155. Id. at 26.
156. 738 P.2d 254, 263 (Wash. 1987).
157. Id.
158. Id.
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without termination of the legal parent’s rights, have used the danger of
these adoptions opening the door to families with more than two parents as
a basis for denying or restricting the adoptions. The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin raised the issue in 1994 when it denied a lesbian co-parent the
right to adopt her partner’s child despite acknowledging that the adoption
would be in the child’s best interests.159 The issue before the court was
whether the legal rights of one or both of the birth parents had to be
terminated before an adoption could occur.160 The petitioner argued that
she should be allowed to adopt with the only termination being of the
father’s rights (an outcome with which the father was in full agreement).161
In rejecting this argument, the court noted that:
If we . . . accept this interpretation, then [a] husband and wife could
jointly adopt [a] minor without severing the ties between the remaining
birth parent and the minor. The minor would then have three parents.
Subsequently, a court could terminate the rights of one of the three
parents and a second husband and wife could jointly adopt the minor,
giving the minor four parents. . . . This process could go on ad infinitum.
Obviously, the petitioners’ interpretations of [the relevant statutes] . . .
could lead to absurd results. This court will not construe a statute so as
to work absurd or unreasonable results.162

In a dissent to the California Supreme Court decision validating the
“second parent” adoption procedure for California, two of the justices of
that court raised a similar concern, noting that:
Under the majority’s approach, [the relevant statute’s] termination of the
birth parents rights in any type of adoption—not merely those that seek
to add a second parent—can be waived by mutual agreement, thus
permitting a child to have three or more parents. . . . I cannot fathom why
the majority has deliberately chosen a rationale that is unnecessary to the
disposition of this case and that has been avoided by other jurisdictions,
but I do understand and fear the effect of the majority’s additional
holding: to put at risk fundamental understandings of family and
parentage. Tomorrow, the question may be: How many legal parents
may a child have in California? And the answer, according to the
majority opinion, will be: As many parents as a single family court
judge, in the exercise of the broadest discretion in our law, deems to be

159. See, e.g., Georgina G. v. Terry M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 685 (Wis. 1994) (denying a
lesbian the opportunity to adopt her partner’s biological child despite the adoption being in
the best interests of the child because the child could still associate and maintain a strong
loving bond with her mother’s partner).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 684.
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in the child’s best interest.163

More recently, in the California Supreme Court case of Elisa B. v.
Superior Court, the court made clear that its earlier statement that a
California child could not have two natural mothers was a reaction to the
threat in Johnson v. Calvert that if the gestational mother were legally
recognized the child might end up with more than two parents. 164 As
stated by the court:
In Johnson . . . we addressed the situation in which three people claimed
to be the child’s parents: the husband, who undoubtedly was the child’s
father, and two women, who presented competing claims to being the
child’s mother. . . . We rejected the suggestion of amicus curiae that
both the wife and the surrogate could be the child’s mother, stating that a
child can have only one mother, but what we considered and rejected in
Johnson was the argument that a child could have three parents.165

What is clear from these cases is that fear of children ending up with more
than two parents is coloring the decisionmaking processes in courts and
legislatures around the country. However, as courts take a long, hard look
at new ways of defining the parent-child relationship, it must be recognized
that either California’s intent-based approach or the functional-family
approach adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court could result in children
having more than two parents.
Where more than two people jointly use assisted reproductive
technologies to procreate with the explicit intent that all of them be legal
parents, there is no empirical reason why they could not all end up with full
legal parental status. In the same way, when more than two adults actively
and successfully parent children over a period of years, it may be in the
children’s best interests to provide legal protection to these multiple
parental relationships on which the children rely. Again, this does not
necessarily imply that custody should be split more than two ways if the
adults end their relationships (though such a result is also possible).
However, recognition of parentage in more than two adults, as the facts
dictate, would allow a more full consideration of best interests by the court
than is allowed where some of the child’s most significant adults are locked

163. Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554, 575, 582 (Cal. 2004).
164. See 117 P.3d 660, 667, 669-70 (Cal. 2005) (finding that the presumption that a man
who receives a child into his home and holds him out as his natural child analogously
applies to a lesbian woman who was found to be a natural mother because she cared for her
former partner’s child and paid for the child’s health insurance).
165. Id. at 666 (readdressing and rejecting the court’s earlier concern in Johnson v.
Calvert that a recognition of two natural mothers would diminish the recognized mother’s
role, and finding that a natural parent is any person who receives a child into her home and
holds it out to the public as her natural child and, therefore, the former lesbian partner had
an obligation to pay child support).
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out of court.
CONCLUSION
The danger to children engendered by the present system results from
courts’ clutching at overly rigid approaches to determining parentage,
approaches that do not allow for the full range of human procreative and
parental conduct. One basis for this rigidity is an almost obsessive fear of
recognizing what is an undeniable reality of our society—that some
children have more than two parents. The inflexible position of our state
courts—that where there are three people standing in clear parental roles,
each with valid claims to parentage based on either genetics plus parental
conduct or membership in an intact marital family, there nevertheless can
be only two legal parents—is based on an historical perspective that may
no longer be valid.
The children in Michael H. and Craig L. would have been well served by
a finding that they had more than two parents. In Michael H., the child
formally joined with her genetic father in requesting that his relationship
with her be legally recognized. The court could have done this without
undermining the public policy of supporting the marital family by
acknowledging the factual reality that the child had three parents and
granting visitation rights to Michael. In Craig L., the facts strongly suggest
that the child had been encouraged to form a bonded parental relationship
with four adults, given that Craig’s wife was the one who actually stayed
home with the child during the days when Craig, Sandy, and Brian were all
at work. Thus, that child arguably should be found to have four legal
parents, with custody and visitation rights spread between the adults in a
manner determined by the court to be in the child’s best interests. In this
way, even if the court decided the child should live with Sandy and Brian
in their home, in deference to the marital presumption, the child would not
have lost two of the parents he had been raised to rely on during his
infancy.
Legal parentage does not guarantee custodial parentage, so assigning
legal status to all the functional parents in a child’s life would not
necessarily require that a child be moved around among multiple homes for
custody purposes. Instead, it would allow courts to engage in a best
interests analysis that is never reached when some of the parties who have
acted as parents are denied any legal recognition. It thereby would ensure
that many more children would have continued access to all the people
with whom they have formed significant, parental attachments, and the
public policies of respecting genetic connections and supporting marital
families could still be served. The current insistence on resolving all
parentage disputes in favor of a child having only two legally recognized
parents is a “lose-lose” proposition in these cases and should be
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reexamined.
When courts and/or legislatures seek to define legal parentage outside
the context of “traditional” families, many factors come into play. Clearly,
there are competing public policy concerns that have to be addressed.
However, using the basic factors of genetics, procreative intent, parental
conduct, and marital presumptions as guides, it is worth looking at whether
limiting children to only two legal parents in every circumstance is in their
best interests. Recognition of more than two legal parents should be
limited to cases where the specific facts support this result so as to avoid
unnecessarily exposing children to the risk of overly complex custody
disputes. But where the facts support a finding that there are three (or
more) functional parents, all of whom the child has formed a substantial
parent-child attachment such that the child could be detrimentally impacted
by loss of that adult from their lives, the courts should be open to
considering this option.
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